Les commentaires et analyses développés n'engagent que leurs auteurs qui restent seuls responsables des erreurs et insuffisances. 
Introduction
The recent global recession and financial crisis, along with the policy actions taken to buffer their effects, have eroded fiscal positions in several countries, raising concerns about the sustainability of public finances. Policymakers are therefore urged to undertake appropriate measures to put back public finances on a sustainable path. To this end, the establishment of fiscal rules appears inter alia, as a good candidate. Indeed, fiscal rules -FRs hereafter-are "a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal performance" (Kopits and Symansky, 1998) . Well designed and implemented, they are able to strengthen fiscal credibility and fiscal discipline, in that they place a durable constraint on the discretion of fiscal authorities (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Debrun et al., 2007; Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998; von Hagen, 1992; von Hagen and Harden, 1995; Inman, 1996; and Poterba, 1996) . First started in the developed countries, the new wave of FRs has gained the developing world.
1 To date, twenty-five low-income and middle-income countries have adopted FRs at the national level to frame the conduct of their fiscal policy (IMF, 2009 ).
Parallel to this growing appetite for FRs in developing countries, a few papers attempted to evaluate their effectiveness in shaping fiscal behaviours in these countries. Alesina et al. (1999) are the first study to assess the impact of FRs in developing countries, namely in Latin America and the Caribbean. Thereafter, Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) , Gollwitzer (2011) , Hallerberg et al. (2009), Poter and Diamond (1999) , and Prakash and Cabezon (2008) analysed the effect of FRs and found that they improve fiscal discipline in developing countries. But a drawback, common to all these existing studies, is that they ignore the selfselection problem in policy adoption, which might bias the estimate of the effect of FRs in these early studies. A more formal re-evaluation of the impact of FRs, taking into account the self-selection problem in policy adoption is therefore necessary.
The aim of this paper is therefore to assess the effect of FRs on fiscal developments, by addressing carefully the issue of self-selection this time. To this end, we make use of a variety of propensity scores-matching and a wide panel of 74 developing countries, of which 22 have introduced rule-based fiscal frameworks by the end of 2007, to evaluate the treatment effect of FRs. In the literature related to monetary policy, such methods have been used to evaluate the impact of inflation targeting, a monetary policy framework where self-selection is potentially also at work (Lin and Ye, 2007) . But to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first study to take into account this self-selection problem while investigating the impact of
FRs. More precisely, throughout the paper, we aim to answer the following questions: do national numerical FRs improve fiscal discipline as measured by the cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal balance (CAPB), after controlling for self-selection? Does the treatment effect vary with the types of rules (Budget Balance Rules, Expenditure Rules and Debt rules)?
Finally, is there heterogeneity in the treatment effect of FRs, depending on countries structural characteristics? We explore five possible sources of heterogeneities: number of FRs in place, time length since FRs adoption, presence of supranational FRs, government fractionalisation and government stability.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the second section describes the econometric methodology and introduces the dataset. Section 3 shows the propensity scores-matching results while section 4 considers some robustness checks. In section 5, we explore the heterogeneity feature of the treatment effect of FRs using a control function regression approach. Section 6 briefly concludes and draws some policy recommendations.
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The data
Our dataset consists of 74 developing countries examined over the period 1990-2007. 2 The panel is unbalanced because of missing observations. The time coverage of the sample is It is worthnoting that in the existing literature, the effectiveness of FRs is assessed using not only the presence of numerical targets or limits on fiscal aggregates, but also employing other aspects related to the strength or intensity of these rules. These include their statutory basis, the sanctions for breaking the rules, the procedures required to modify or amend the rules, the share of government finances covered by rules and fiscal transparency. However, the propensity-scores matching used in this paper allows building a binary measure of FRs only, indicating the presence or not of rule, but not to build a synthetic FRs index summarising the other aspects mentioned above. Furthermore, even though it would be possible to analyse the importance of the strength of the rules when we will explore the heterogeneity feature of the treatment effect of FRs using a control function regression approach, most of these aspects related to the strength of FRs are missing for many countries in our sample. Attempting to analyse the influence of the strength of the rule on the treatment effect of FRs will imply a significant reduction in our sample size. Accordingly, we choose to use only the simple binary measure of FR. In the econometric analysis below, FR is a dummy variable equalling one, if in a given country at a given year a numerical constraint exists on any fiscal aggregate at the national level (budget balance, spending, revenue or debt). BBR, ER, RR and DR are dummies variables equalling one, if in a given country at a given year a numerical constraint is placed only on budget balance, expenditure, revenue and debt respectively. Timor-Leste (2005) also adopted FRs, but due to lack of available data on fiscal balances, they are not included in our sample. 7 The numerical constraints are generally expressed as a ceiling or a target. For instance, the BBR may target a specific budget balance in nominal terms, a specific budget balance as a percentage of GDP or a specific budget balance as a percentage of GDP in cyclically-adjusted or structural terms. The DR may target a specific amount of debt in nominal terms; a specific debt-to-GDP ratio or may establish a ceiling for the Government debt in level or as a % of GDP. The ER may specify a ceiling on the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, a ceiling on current expenditure growth or expenditure limits inserted in a mediumterm expenditure framework. Finally, the RR may specify desired developments of the tax base, a target for revenue-to-GDP ratio or a ceiling on the use of oil revenues. latter catches the part of primary fiscal balance unexplained by economic conditions and is our measure of fiscal discipline (CAPB). 10 To correct for a potential endogeneity of output gap in equation (1), we use the two stages least squares (2SLS) method and instrument the 8 In the literature, the CAPB is also calculated using a three-step procedure, especially in several international organisations (OECD, IMF or European Commission, see Girouard and André, 2005) . First, they calculate a measure of potential GDP. Second, to estimate the budget balance that is due to business cycle fluctuations, they apply the elasticity of government revenues and expenditures, to the deviation between the effective GDP and the potential GDP. Third, they deduct the CAPB by subtracting the budget balance estimated in the second step, from the primary fiscal balance actually observed. Although very attractive, this methodology is very intensive in detailed data, namely in the estimation of revenue and expenditure elasticity. As such detailed information does not exist in developing countries we rather focus on the "residuals" approach. 9 We have also used 6.25 as smoothing parameter, but this does not change significantly the estimation results. 10 Note that Fatás and Mihov (2003; 2006) rather took the standard deviation of the error term (and not the error term itself) because they were interested in the volatility of fiscal policy (and not fiscal policy itself). As depicted in Figure 1 Indeed, the CAPE decreased between the pre-FR period and the post-FR period in treated countries while it increased in the control group. Regarding public debt, it decreased between the pre-FR period and the post-FR in the treated countries as well as in the control group, but more in the first group. Nevertheless, are these naive correlations corroborated by a more rigorous econometric analysis? In the next section, we assess the impact of FRs more formally, by controlling for the self-selection problem in policy adoption.
Methodology
Our objective is to evaluate the treatment effect of FRs on fiscal discipline. To this end,
we consider the adoption of FRs by a country as a treatment, just as in the program evaluation literature in microeconomic studies. Consistently with this literature, we refer to the countries having adopted FRs -FRers hereafter-as the treated group, and to the non-FRers as the control group. Then, the average effect of being a FRer on fiscal discipline, the so-called Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT), can be expressed as follows: = the outcome value really observed on the same FRs country. Equation (2) is telling us that a simple comparison between the outcome value (fiscal discipline in our case) observed in the treatment group and the outcome value observed in the same countries if they had not adopted FRs would give us an unbiased estimate of the ATT. Unfortunately, it is not possible to observe this latter outcome value since we cannot observe the fiscal performance a FRer had it not adopted FRs. We face here, as it is common in non-experimental studies, an identification problem.
A common approach to circumvent this difficulty is to compare the sample mean budgetary outcome of the treatment group with that of the control group if and only if assignment to the treatment is random. However, FRs adoption may be non-random, as FRs halshs-00667201, version 1 -7 Feb 2012 may be correlated with a set of observable variables that also affects the outcome variable, leading to the so-called self-selection problem.
12 Simple comparison of the sample mean budgetary outcome between the two groups would then produce biased estimates of the ATT.
As in Lin and Ye (2007) , to address this problem of selection on observables, we make use of a variety of propensity scores-matching methods recently developed in the treatment literature.
Matching on Propensity-Scores
Propensity Scores-Matching (PSM hereafter) consists of pairing FRers with non-FRers which have similar observed characteristics, so that the difference between the outcome of a
FRer and that of a matched counterfactual is attributable to the treatment (FRs adoption). A key assumption needed to apply PSM is "conditional independence"
⊥ which requires that conditional on the observables (X), the outcome be independent of the treatment variable. Under this assumption, equation (2) can be rewritten as:
where we have replaced
as the number of covariates in X increases, matching on X would be difficult to implement in practice; to overcome this high dimension problem, we follow Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) and base the matching on the propensity scores (instead of X ). The propensity score (PS hereafter) is the probability of adopting the IT regime, conditional to the observable
Under a final assumption needed for the validity of the PSM (the so-called "common
, namely the existence of some comparable control units for each treated unit), we estimate the ATT as
12 It is worthnoting that the Propensity Scores-Matching method does not implicitly account for the unobservables; as a result, the issues it addresses differ from those related to selection on unobservables (omitted variables) as well as from a Heckman-type sample selection problem (see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002, and Heckman et al., 1998 for further details).
Estimating the propensity scores (PS)
We estimate the PS using a probit model with the binary variable FR as the dependent variable. Our baseline selection equation includes past fiscal development variables (Cyclically-Adjusted Primary budget Balance-CAPB-and Debt, both as GDP percentage, and lagged one ear), the real per capita GDP growth rate, dependency ratio, government stability, government fractionalisation, inflation and a dummy for the presence of a supranational FR.
We expect FRs to be introduced more likely in fiscally healthier countries, since the public credibility regarding the ability of government to meet its announced targets for fiscal aggregates is the cornerstone of FRs (Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008; and IMF, 2009 ).
Accordingly, we expect a positive correlation between the probability of FRs adoption and the lagged value of CAPB, but a negative correlation with the lagged value of public debt. 13 We also expect FRs to be adopted more likely in countries with good macroeconomic performances (IMF, 2009). As a result, the expected signs on the estimated coefficients of real per capita GDP growth rate and inflation are positive and negative respectively. Countries with higher dependency ratio, which implies generally higher public fiscal burden, are less likely to adopt rule-based fiscal frameworks (Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008) . We therefore expect a negative correlation between FRs adoption and dependency ratio, that is the ratio of dependents (people younger than 15 or older than 64) to working-age population (those ages 15-64). Regarding the politico-institutional factors, we expect a positive link between the probability of adopting FRs and the fragmentation of government. Indeed, according to the "tying their hands" approach, FRs introduction can be viewed as a mechanism to rule out the deficit bias originating from the so-called "common-pool" problem (Alesina and Perotti, 1995; and Debrun et al., 2008) . The expected sign on government stability is ambiguous a priori. Indeed, on the one hand, greater government stability may lead to lower deficit bias, which in turn should be associated positively with FRs adoption. On the other hand, government instability, that is the inability of the government to stay in office and carry out its declared programs, may encourage governments to tie their hands through
FRs adoption in order to ensure fiscal discipline despite the succession of different executive teams. In this spirit, greater government stability might be less conducive to FRs adoption.
Finally, we expect a positive link between the supranational fiscal rule dummy and FRs adoption at the national level, as the presence of supranational fiscal rule may catalyse the introduction of the national ones (Debrun et al., 2008; and IMF, 2009) . Note: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Constants included (but not reported).*, **, and ***: significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
14 According to the conditional independence assumption, omitting in the probit model, variables that systematically affect the probability of enacting FRs but do not affect budgetary outcomes, has little influence on results (Persson, 2001) . In other words, an estimate bias occurs only if we omit an explanatory variable that simultaneously affect fiscal discipline and the probability of adopting FRs. We give much attention to this issue when selecting variables into the probit model. Heckman et al. (1998) . Fourth, we consider the kernel matching, which matches a FRer to all non-FRers weighted proportionally to their closeness to the treated country. As the matching 15 The estimated coefficient on lagged public debt becomes positive with BBR and DR, but remains negative (although not statistically significant) with ER. The estimated coefficient on the supranational dummy becomes negative with BBR and ER but proved to be not significantly different from zero. 16 While matching FRers to non-FRers, we employ the "common support" option. With this option, we exclude the treated countries whose the PS is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum PS of the untreated countries.
halshs-00667201, version 1 -7 Feb 2012
estimator presents no analytical variance, we compute standard errors by bootstrapping (that is by re-sampling the observations of the control group, see Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) .
The upper panel of 17 We do not assess the effect of revenue rule (RR) because only two countries (Kenya and Nigeria) enacted RR in our sample.
significance of the estimated ATT, and to a lesser extent the fact that in some cases the sign of the ATT of DR is even positive, might be due to the inability of the simple binary measure of DR to account for the other important aspects -enforcement, monitoring, transparency, sanctions-necessary for the success of any rules. 
Robustness Checks
To make sure that we filter out sufficiently any possible polluting effect resulting from observables known to affect both fiscal performances and the probability of adopting FRs, we augment the probit model by controlling respectively for the lagged value of the squared public debt (for a possible non-linearity in the effect of public debt), the logarithm of real per capita GDP (proxy for the level of economic development), quality of the bureaucracy (proxy for institutional quality), trade openness, and international official reserves to GDP. The results remain robust to these new specifications: the probit results as well as the estimated ATT do not change qualitatively and quantitatively.
Exploring the heterogeneity in the treatment effect
Even though developing countries share some common features, there exists however some differences between them, including inter alia, their socio-political and institutional contexts. They may even differ in some aspects related to the way they apply FRs. Given that these factors may make different, the ATT of FRs on fiscal discipline, we explore in this section the presence of heterogeneity in the treatment effect of FRs. We test five possible sources of heterogeneity: the number of FRs in place, the time length since FRs introduction, the presence of a supranational FR, government fractionalisation and government stability.
19
For this purpose, we use a control function regression approach, adapted from Lin and Ye (2009) and described as follows. We perform, within the common support from the matching in previous section, the simple following OLS regression:
it Pscore , the estimated propensity scores from our baseline probit model, is included as a control function. X it is the set of possible sources of heterogeneity variables. The coefficient of the interactive term between the FR dummy and Xit,θ , catches the heterogeneity feature of the treatment effect of FRs. show that the treatment effect of FRs is reduced by the presence of supranational rules and government fragmentation whereas it is enhanced by government stability. The first result of this set of three may be due to the fact that supranational FRs are weakly enforced in developing countries, as documented in Prakash and Cabezon (2008) , so that this may result in negative externalities onto the national rules, leading to an overall smaller treatment effect.
Regarding the role of government fragmentation, it is in accordance with Alesina and Perotti (1995) who argue that the common pool problem is expected to be stronger in fragmented and heterogeneous government coalitions. Finally, the enhanced treatment effect of FRs in more stable governments suggests that the ability of government to stay in power and carry out its 20 Note that as this appears in equation (6), normally, both interacted variables, FR and X it , should be included in the regression individually. But in column [3] of Table 3 , we do not include Number of FRs in the regression because the interaction term is the same as Number of FRs. Similarly, Time is not included in the regression of column [4] , because the interaction term is the same as Time. 21 It would have been more relevant to use for example the share of government finances covered by rules. But the lack of availability of such data in developing countries prevents us from using this measure.
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We also explore the heterogeneity in the treatment effect of ER on the CAPE. The results (see Table 8 ) confirm the previous conditional discipline-enhancing effects of FR. Indeed, it appears that while the reducing-effect of ER on the CAPE decreases with the existence of supranational FRs and the degree of fractionalisation of the government, it increases with the degree of stability of the government. However, the number of rules in place as well as the time length since the introduction of an ER does not influence any more significantly the reducing-effect of ER on the CAPE. Note: in brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications). *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Constant terms are included but not reported.
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Finally, for the sake of robustness check, we carried out the same control function regressions, but controlling for country-fixed and year-fixed effects this time. The main results remain robust to these new specifications (see Appendices 5 and 6 for the effect of FR on the CAPB and the effect of ER on the CAPE respectively).
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse the relationship between national fiscal rules (FRs) and fiscal discipline in developing countries. Based on a wide panel data of 74 developing countries over the period 1990-2007, this paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to take into account the self-selection problem in policy adoption while evaluating the effect of In terms of policy implications, this paper suggests that the introduction of rule-based fiscal frameworks remains a credible remedy for governments in developing countries against fiscal indiscipline. This is particularly important in the current context, where the implementation of massive stimulus plans has eroded fiscal positions in many countries, which commands to undertake credible measures to put back public finances on a sustainable path. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the simple adoption of FRs is not sufficient to guarantee fiscal credibility and fiscal discipline. Their adoption must be accompanied with a set of other measures, beyond the scope of this study, but essential to the success of FRs. Such measures include inter alia, fiscal transparency, fiscal responsibility, enforcement mechanisms, sanctions and independent fiscal institutions (fiscal councils Note: ER=Expenditure Rule; CAPE=Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Expenditure. In brackets the bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications). *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Constant terms are included but not reported. 
